When interdependence is two-way, the decision node to consider concerns
whether a coordination solution is available. A
co-ordination solution is one in which all actors are satisfied with
a given course of action, and no trade-offs or conflicts of interests
are present. If is is unknown whether such a solution
exists, the indicated task is governance description, which involves
understanding the interests, preferences and networks of relevant
actors. When a co-ordination solution is available,
communication, awareness raising or information sharing
amongst the private actors is required in order to promote coordination
and facilitate adaptation. For example, in shared
transboundary river basins, there may be sufficient water to fulfill
demand provided that extraction of water takes at different times in a
coordinated manner. It may be sufficient for actors share
information about when they will extract the resource, in order
to avoid shortages at any given time, while still providing enough
water to cover all of the individual actors’
demands.
When no coordination solution is
available then a
social dilemma is present. This means that there is a
conflict between the social optima and individual private interests and
some or all private actors involved need to compromise their own
interests. One prominent type of such a challenge is the
over-exploitation of a common pool resource. An example of
such a situation would be a common groundwater stock that is declining
under climate change and is used by a group of farmers to
irrigate their fields (Varela-Ortega et al. 2013). Another
prominent type is the private provisioning of a public goods. Take, for
example, a community of private actors facing increasing
risks of flooding and needing to collaborate to maintain the
dike that protects them. In these cases, internal solutions are not
very likely, but still possible and understanding the nature
of these conflicts and identifying policy measures requires
in-depth institutional analysis (see the Patfinder's decision tree for
choosing approaches to institutional analysis). There are no
panaceas to policy design for social dilemmas; all
instruments or mixes thereof may be applicable. The success of
policy measures in a given case depends upon many case-specific factors
and it is difficult to generalise from one case to another.
Furthermore, in some cases, policy intervention might even
be counterproductive, which underlines the importance of contextual
knowledge provided by institutional analysis (Ostrom, 2005).
The
pathfinder provides decision trees for selecting the tasks to
be carried out for public actors influencing individual
and collective adaptation (currently selected decision tree)
respectively. Table 2.6 further illustrates the choice of
tasks and methods based on the criteria interdependence and
coordination with the help of a couple of examples.
Type of interdependence | Coordination solution? | Indication on
salient approach | Example |
N/a | Yes | Communication | Public actor
wanting to influence coordinated use of a shared river basin. |
One-way | No | Regulation or
economic incentives | Public actor wanting to influence farmers to provide land for migration corridor maintenance for key biodiversity species. |
Two-way | No | Institutional analysis | Public actor
wanting to influence farmers using a shared and already scarce groundwater resource that is declining under climate change. |
This section is based on the UNEP PROVIA guidance document |
1. | You want to identify adaptation measures. | |
2. | Your focus is on public actors and on collective actions. | |
3. | The interdepencence is two-way. | |
4. | As a next step you are faced with the question whether there is a coordination solution. |